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Brien Williams:
This is an oral history interview with former Senator Harris Wofford for
the George J. Mitchell Oral History Project at Bowdoin College. We are in the senator’s home
in Washington, D.C., and today is Friday, June 12, 2009, and I am Brien Williams. I thought we
might start with the steps that brought you to the Senate.
Harris Wofford:

To the Senate?

BW: To the Senate, and my first question was, when did you learn of Senator Heinz’s death,
and under what circumstances?
HW: I was up having lunch with David Riesman, a sociologist at Harvard, of fame; The
Lonely Crowd is one of his great bestsellers. And I was giving a talk on national service at the
Kennedy Institute of Politics, and doing a seminar that led into a supper and drinking wine and
such, and the conversation turned around to whether I had the guts to run against Arlen Specter
for the Senate two years later, I think it was. And then we talked - Alan Khazei, the founder of
City Year, one of the big national service leaders was there, and the woman running it ran for the
Senate, a leading Democratic contestant who went on to do interesting things, but she lost her
Senate race – it was her seminar. And it was a great huddle on how you might win against
Arlen, and could you? And could you run on things like national service?
And that had been the previous afternoon, and the talk was going to be the next evening, and at
lunch I got interrupted by an assistant of mine, when I was secretary of labor and industry in
Harrisburg, who says that he heard on the radio driving his car that John Heinz had crashed and
died, along with a number of young kids, in an elementary schoolyard very near my home in
Bryn Mawr. And he stopped the car, went into the nearest bar and said, “I’ve got to borrow your
phone for a minute, can you” – this is pre-cell phone, I guess, isn’t it, because he’s a big cell
phone man now – he said, “I’ve got to call the next senator from Pennsylvania.” The bartender
didn’t know what he was talking about. And he tracked me down and interrupted me at the
faculty club, and it changed the conversation to, well, from his point of view and some of the
people at the seminar about, “Now how do we get you appointed to being senator?”
Now Casey said to the Cabinet, “I don’t want anybody maneuvering or stirring up or beating the
drum for me to pick them, I want this to be a period of mourning for” – I forget how many weeks
he said – “I’m going to be doing thinking while I do it, but I don’t want any politicing on it,” and
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I was resolutely following his instructions. Two days later or something, he said, “How well do
you know” – whatever this guy’s name was – and I didn’t remember his name at all. And he
said, “You must know him, come on now.” And I said, “No, why?” He says, “One of the
biggest donors in the Democratic Party, and a state committeeman maybe, and he owns the
Coronado Hotel.” I said, “Never heard of him.” “Well why would he have written this
wonderful letter about you, this just stunning letter, if you don’t know him?” I said, “I have no
idea.”
And the next day he said, “I have another couple of letters.” And he believed me that I was not
doing anything, I think, because he tended to believe that I told the truth. And I really had no
guess where these were coming from; they were from major donors of the party, most of whom I
didn’t know at all. And about a week later Alan Cranston called me and said, “From the moment
I heard about John’s death, I started writing my major donors, or calling them, and persuading
them that you should be the senator and they should write Casey, and I helped them write their
different letters, right?” We were old, old friends, Cranston and I had co-chaired with Willie
Brown and Marjorie Benton, his ill-fated presidential campaign on the nuclear arms control issue
in ‘84. And, but we go way back to World Federalist days when, I guess I was just out of the
Army Air Corps at the end of World War II.
And so Alan did that. I think if - My wife hated me co-chairing that campaign, she was sure it
was going to lose, and I was sort of intrigued with running a campaign but I was very loyal to
Alan as an old friend, and I thought he was completely right on nuclear arms control, the right
approach. And I think, if I hadn’t done that for Cranston, he would have been for me going to
the Senate, [but] I don’t think he would have revved up this tremendous campaign that he put on
with the major donors. And interestingly enough, [lack of money] was said to be the biggest
obstacle to Casey appointing me. His wife – and some other people – but his wife said, “Of
course Harris is the one that you should appoint.” We were at Covington & Burling together,
and [Casey] very much appreciated my civil rights role particularly [ ].
And later I heard that he told his wife and other people that were speaking for me that, “It can’t
be Harris because, I’ve just gotten this multiple disease problem, I’ve just raised this money for
my reelection and I was worn out doing it. Harris has never raised political money, has none
himself, and it has to be a rich person. Almost no one has a chance to beat Thornburgh, who
they’re going to send back to reclaim the seat.” No Democrat had won a Senate seat twenty-nine
years since Joe [Joseph S.] Clark. And he said, “It has to be [someone] rich, and it has to be
somebody who’s young in case there’s a fluke, they win, so they can hold the seat, and Harris is
sixty-five, and it has to be from western Pennsylvania, because that’s the only way we can have a
dent in Thornburgh.”
And so he first offered it to the leading son of the great Irish Catholic family, the patriarch of it
has just been appointed either ambassador to Ireland, or to the Vatican, they own the Steelers.
BW:

The Rooneys.
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HW: Rooney, Art Rooney was the son, who was offered the Senate seat. I don’t think the
press ever got wind of that, or not in a big way. And he turned it down after about a week,
because he had three young kids and he didn’t think anybody could really beat Thornburgh. And
then Carville, who we had picked to run Casey’s gubernatorial campaign but hadn’t gotten much
publicity for that when Casey won – I was Democratic Party chair at Casey’s request full-time
for six months during the campaign and helped pick Carville – Carville persuaded Casey to offer
the job, to try to get Lee Iacocca to take it. He hadn’t lived in Pennsylvania for decades, but he
had ties to Lehigh or one of the eastern universities, he wasn’t west, he was rich, but he also was
old. And Carville said he’d got it all greased, and the only thing that Iacocca said to Carville
when he flew out was, “You have to get Casey to come and offer it to me here, I’m not going to
go and meet him somewhere else.” And so they persuaded Casey to fly out, the whole press got
wind of it, had huge headlines, he’s flying out to - And he said, “I need twenty-four hours,” and
he turned it down. And allegedly Ellen turned in bed and said, “Now it has to be Harris,” so
that’s how I got to the Senate.
The first poll was forty-four percent, between me and Thornburgh; he was beating me by fortyfour points. And almost no one except Cranston and my family and I, really, thought I could
win. And later, the best explanation for why I won was given by Thornburgh, who was
persuaded to come back and claim the seat, being told that he was going to have a coronation,
and we gave him an election. But Thornburgh was asked, “What happened?” And he said,
“Well I was the canary that the Republican Party and the administration sent down in the mine to
see what the atmosphere was like, and I’m the canary that didn’t come back.” So it was viewed
as an extraordinary upset.
Now when I got to the Senate, being appointed, Mitchell sai – he was the majority leader –
Mitchell said, “I need his vote tomorrow by three o’clock,” and they announced it at two o’clock
the previous day, and Mitchell said, “We must swear him in before three o’clock, because it’s an
urgent vote.” And so my wife and my chief of staff, they all started packing, and we got [in] two
cars and we drove down and got down at about one o’clock in the morning and I got sworn in,
and then I was marvelously treated by Mitchell: number one, obviously the leader who
welcomed me, and I was another vote for a time, and he also had known me a little bit in the
Peace Corps or the Kennedy years. We had a mutual great friend, Berl Bernhard, one of my best
friends, who I got to work on the Civil Rights Commission staff and then became the executive
director of it. Are you doing Berl?
BW:

I have done.

HW: Yes, well Berl’s one of my great characters and one of my closest friends ever since law
school, ‘54, and he’s a tremendous fan of George Mitchell as you probably know. Anyway,
Alan Cranston probably, in part, orchestrated it, but half a dozen, if not more, leaders of the
Senate got up and gave these extraordinary speeches about me. Now they all felt it was giving,
helping to give me a chance, and they told my story, whatever it was, and they made it sound
great. And somebody said they can’t remember [such] a response, which I’m sure [ ] was
orchestrated, but it did give me, it gave quite a boost in the press and otherwise, that maybe I was
Page 3 of 20

something special and not just a fluke. Various publications, the New Yorker [Hendrik] Rick
Hertzberg said that, “If the founding fathers had picked a senator that represented what they
wanted in the Senate, Harris Wofford would be the…” something like that, it was very
extravagant, helpful stuff. And we set off in the campaign.
Mitchell did everything in the six months before the special election to help me, both offering the
best committees, from my point of view the best. I can’t remember for sure what all of them
were, but the Foreign Relations Committee was something I, all my life, would have said,
“That’s what I want to do.” Carville said, “No one has ever won a vote by going on the Foreign
Relations Committee, and plenty have lost, and it’s one place you’re sure to get into trouble, and
don’t do it.” He says, “Don’t do it! You can’t come out alive if you go on that damn Foreign
Relations Committee.” I [did go on the Foreign Relations Committee and] on the Health and
Education Committee, and the Environment Committee, and so I had great political committee
assignments.
And Daschle also teamed up with me, at his suggestion, [ ] I was going to run on the banner of
universal health care, and he had already shaped a bill that was very close to what I was initially
saying, though I knew very little about health reform or health care, and I liked very much
Daschle’s approach. It’s sort of a Federal Reserve Board of the health industry that would be
thinking through how do you cut costs and do various things, and have very substantial powers
but wouldn’t be running it, but it would have a public option and various things. And [in] his
book that he did recently, Daschle is renewing that, and it was a joint Daschle-Wofford bill, and
it helped in the campaign.
Now, the first real test was, will the Senate Democratic [Campaign] Committee [DSCC] give any
money in this off-year 1991 election? When it’s in debt and it’s just beginning to try to raise the
money to support the – what is it? – a third of the Senate [up for election] and of [that] third,
[about] half of them Democrats. Robb, who was the, Senator Robb of Virginia was the person
running that committee that year, and he immediately said, “I’m not going to support a dollar to
Harris unless every member who’s up next year – knowing that this is money that they might
have had, and it’s going to take us further into debt – unless every member who is up supports
the committee giving the money.”
And Mitchell went to work, Daschle went to work, Cranston went to work, and Mitchell was our
leader, saying, “We should do it.” And I think Daschle was up, and I think it was a closed
meeting – I wasn’t there but I heard about it – where they argued. And Robb was dumbfounded
when every single one of the senators coming up said, “We want to do it.” And I don’t know
when it got to half a million, but they and labor were the two that advanced the money to let us
go on television before Labor Day and to really have a campaign that had a base. And Mitchell
was behind that.
He was throughout, in my experience, campaigning for a man and helping pilot things in the
Senate in a way that would help me win the election. And of course the reelection, the same
thing, and [in] the three or four years before the ‘94 sweep by Gingrich and company, and
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Santorum. So that’s my paean of praise, from a very personal standpoint, to Mitchell, who, for
good reasons, for the party and for himself but with great constancy and generosity, helped me,
and went beyond what I would have expected. Well, I didn’t know what to expect.
He loaned, I think, Mike Feldman, who was sort of a clerk in the Senate caucus room, who’s
become a big partner in one of the biggest political consulting firms based right across over on
the Georgetown harbor there, I know the name, [it’s] on my tongue. Mike became a key Vice
President Gore campaigner and Clinton campaigner. He’s an extraordinary guy, but he was very
young then and Mitchell encouraged him to go up and join my campaign and take leave from the
Senate, and for all I know he may have campaigned some when he wasn’t on leave from the
Senate. And he was a terrific help, and that I’m pretty sure, came from Mitchell.
And I had, from the very beginning, clicked with George. I thought he was wise, and was really
searching for the common good, and wanted to tap the better angels of our nature, you know, a
search for common ground person. And I thought to a considerable extent that he and Dole had
that kind of relationship, that’s the way it came through to me.
BW:

All right. Let me just pause here for a second.

(Pause in taping.)
HW: I don’t think George came to the little prayer breakfast very often in those years. Paul
Simon persuaded me that this little weekly, one-hour, eight in the morning, bipartisan, nonpolitical breakfast, where somebody gave a prayer, and then somebody was chosen to lead a
discussion, and it wasn’t about bills, and it wasn’t by religious doctrine, it was personal
experience that you could put in the spiritual realm in some ways, or family, and Paul Simon
says, “That’s the only way you’ll get to know Republicans.” And I found that it was true, that at
cocktail parties you just buzz and it isn’t a real conversation, you don’t really get to know
people, and at committee meetings you’re on opposite sides and arguing against each other often,
and it was very valuable for me. I still go occasionally.
Mansfield, until a few months before he died in ‘95 or something, every day he was in town,
unless he was sick or something, came. He hardly ever said anything, but [he was a] former
leader, not in my time. George didn’t come as a regular participant, but he got periodically
invited, as I recall. And I think it’s one of the places where I began following, hearing about his
work. And undoubtedly, I had other ways over the years to hear him talk about his Ireland
assignment. And I’m talking about later, after I wasn’t in the Senate, going to that prayer
meeting.
And I’m sure you’ve heard the story about hearing an opera each time before he went to Ireland
for negotiation. It’s one of my favorite Mitchell stories. I heard him tell it two or three times,
that he finally got a significant breakthrough by making them all laugh, by telling them very
soberly, “I want to you know that in preparation for my 110th trip,” or whatever it is, “I [ ] like
operas, but I’ve come to believe my [best] preparation for the trip is primarily to hear La
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Traviata,” or whatever his favorite opera was, and, “it prepares me for this, and so I’m
prepared.” And they said, “What do you mean? How does it help?” “Well,” he said, “same
characters, it’s the same plot, it’s the same speeches, it’s the same tune, and they just, no matter
how often I hear it, it’s the same disc, and that’s what I’m prepared for unless you surprise me
and show that someone here will say something new and see if we can move toward a common
ground.” And he said he attributed laughter on that occasion to that breakthrough. Now, he isn’t
automatically the funniest fellow. He’s very earnest, and that’s part of people’s respect for him.
BW:
you.

Hmm-hmm. You basically said a moment ago, there was an affinity between the two of

HW: Well I think it was beyond the personal debt to him for being very generous and helping
me, and caring for all the good reasons of the party for my victory, and personally going beyond
that. A lot of people don’t think he’s warm; I found him quite warm. I noticed my legislative
chief, who went on to work for Daschle and I said, I told him I was doing this [interview], and he
said: “Smart, incredibly smart, secretive – wouldn’t tell you if your pants were on fire –
Machiavellian, interested in big issues, little chilly, remote and removed, not an inclusive leader,
very much a 20th-century type leader, not a futuristic leader. Daschle, his deputy, was elected
partly by the party because he was non-Mitchell, or anti-Mitchell, in terms of inclusiveness and
modernity; blew it on health care but was hemmed in by Clinton, Kennedy – Clinton, Moynihan
and Dole – but he still blew it.”
Now, I’ve read that to you, I was surprised when he said this. Certainly he’s incredibly smart. I
didn’t particularly find him secretive. I think he would tell me if my pants were on fire, because
he was a very caring person; I may like Machiavellian art more than my colleague here does; he
was certainly interested in big issues, that’s something I liked very much. I did not find him a
little chilly, remote and removed, not from me, and maybe I got special treatment, but I know
how much Berl Bernhard thinks he’s warm and fun and great. And I had no idea that there was
any spirit like this about Daschle.
I did go up to Daschle when he announced he was going to run for the leadership in ‘95, before
the Congress adjourned, and I went up and said, “I want you to know I’ll be supporting [you]” –
it wasn’t against Mitchell, I never heard anything about being against Mitchell, I thought of them
as very much alike. Maybe Daschle was a little more agile, I mean a little looser in manner, but
very much a search for common ground guy – I went up and said, “I want to support you.” And
he said, “Well you’re the first person on the floor who’s told me that. I knew some people in
advance were for me, but you’re the first to sign on since I made my announcement on the
floor.” Probably I was sitting in the chair, because junior senators are in the chair when there’s
not some big issue coming up.
And on health care, again, I was sort of in the thick of that battle. This [legislative staff] guy was
very much in it, too. I felt that Clinton the president and Clinton the first lady in charge of the
health care were remote and hard to get to, and shaping it themselves, and not very collaborative,
or collegial. My friend here says, “Hemmed in by Kennedy,” I think Kennedy had a good,
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strong position and I didn’t know that, maybe he was making it hard to compromise. Moynihan
of course was an extraordinary character, and the White House blew it with Moynihan. I never
heard Pat complaining about Mitchell. I do know that, from his wife particularly, but right on
the floor, Moynihan from the beginning said, “This plan is too overreaching, and nobody
consulted me or listened to my advice. I happen to be chairman of that committee, and the way
it came up, it’s dead on arrival,” or something like that. And the White House had some
spokesman, stupid spokesman said, “We’re not concerned about Senator [Moynihan], we can
roll over him,” something very close to that.
BW:

Senator Mitchell or Senator Moynihan?

HW: He said it to the press, where it was published, and from that moment on Moynihan was
basically an enemy of Hillary’s effort, in my opinion. In my own campaigning for Barack,
Moynihan’s wife, who is to this day as anti-[Hillary] as you could imagine BW:

Anti- ?

HW: Excuse me, excuse me, anti-Hillary, so much so, when Pat finally agreed that she could
announce her candidacy, Liz Moynihan says that she accepted it only on condition that she
would not be let into the house, and had to do it all outside. I don’t know if it’s true. There’s an
exchange of papers that I was privy to seeing, because Hillary was overstating her health care
plan in the primary campaign, saying, “We’re going to have health care for everybody,” and
never conveying that, “we’re going to force people that don’t think that they can afford it to pay
if we think they can afford it.” And most people hearing her thought, “Oh, there’s going to be
health care for me of some kind.” And Barack’s position was, “You can make it mandatory
when you’ve really succeeded in bringing costs down so that there’s an option for people that
just think they can’t afford it.”
Anyway, Moynihan said to me on the floor, and then I’ve seen some of the paperwork between
Dole and Moynihan. My wife said, as it looked as if the Hillary plan was going down, despite
Mitchell’s strong efforts to maneuver it through the shoals, it’s right that there were these lions,
the White House and Hillary and Kennedy and the opponents, et cetera, but it looked like it was
going down. And so she, [my wife Clare], who liked Liz Moynihan greatly, they were good
friends, said, “Let’s get Pat Moynihan, Bob Kerrey, and you together for dinner.” We have one
other mutual friend, a fellow Rhodes Scholar, Tom [Thomas Lowe] Hughes, who was at the
dinner. The purpose of it was to see if there could be a new intervention before it all went down,
of a compromise that would at least be a substantial first step. And Pat said, “Harris, you’ve got
to realize that the first Clinton term is going to be a catastrophe, and nothing can save it or this
health plan; but there’s a chance that we can teach him to govern, and his second term will be
satisfactory.”
And then on health care he said, when we got down to, “Is there something that we could jointly
do?” Because Kerrey had his own initiatives, and I was with Daschle, but it was time to get a
compromise, it seemed to me, and to my wife. And Pat said, “No, it’s not time. Don’t worry,
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Harris, there will be a compromise, and we’ll have a good first step, because Bob and I at the
right moment are going to bring forth a compromise that makes sense. Bob will do it” – Bob
Dole, not Bob Kerrey – “Bob will do it because he’s a patriot and we’ve agreed that we can
hammer one out.” And then I, Liz Moynihan showed me the hand note that Dole sent to him at
one of the health care hearings, saying, “Is it time to bring forth our plan?” And whatever the
timing was he had said, “Later in the spring, Harris, it’ll come, just you see, wait.”
And periodically I would say, “How are you doing? It’s getting hot and late.” And he’d say,
“It’ll happen.” And then he came to me and he said, “I’m” – I don’t think he says heartbroken,
but – “I’m dismayed that Bob has just told me that his caucus has tasted blood and that by
beating the Hillary plan totally and no step, they can bring down the Clinton administration, and
that he couldn’t even get his caucus to support his own Dole plan, and he says, ‘We’re lost.’”
And I lost. If we had had a good first step, [a] shift of forty thousand votes out of about four
million, I’m sure, it was the number one thing Santorum had against me. “He went down there
to get universal health care and what did he get? Certainly didn’t get anything there. What he
got is national service, AmeriCorps, and what’s that? It’s a 1960s idea for hippy kids to hold
hands around the campfire, singing Kumbaya at taxpayers’ expense.” That was his opening
gambit. And so George, I thought, was trying his very best to get something through, and we all
blew it, we all blew it. White House blew it; everybody blew it.
BW: On that topic, what was the thinking of you and Carville and others about choosing
health care as your primary issue when you were running in ‘91? Was that a strategic decision,
or was it from the heart?
HW: Well, I don’t think it was. Carville has a big, progressive heart, so it’s probably
something that would always be on his agenda of many things. I think it was a concept that
health care was something that, that we could shape something that would be timely, and that
people were feeling the rising costs on the one hand, but also the non-portability of plans, and if
you’ve changed your jobs and applied for health care, then you’d have to, any pre-existing
condition wouldn’t be paid for. We had lost, Pennsylvania lost, in the years before I became
secretary of labor and industry, had lost several hundred thousand manufacturing jobs, and we’re
still losing them in coal and steel, and we had whole communities that were worried about not
having health care if they lost their job.
My wife, who always worried about whether we’d make ends meet, because we had no backlog
of any wealth, she worried that if I lost the Senate, I was no longer on the state payroll, her
autoimmune disease that she had for ten years would disqualify her for health insurance, and she
was really scared, I mean we were, as the world goes, wealthy, [and she was scared]. So it
quickly proved itself to be a significant thing. And I knew nothing, basically, about it. Clare,
my wife, teased this chief legislative man when we were hiring him and said, after the election,
after we had won, she said, “Now how do you make sense of what Harris’ campaign was? He
won in a very significant extent by the banner of health care, and he’s never been interested in it
and he really knows nothing about it.
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“And secondly,” she said, “ he let Carville get away with taking a World Federalist” – we wrote
a book about aid to, about India in our first years together, my wife and I in 1949, first year we
were married. I mean [he was] a crusader for world union, and [ ] let Carville get away with [the
theme] ‘Take care of our own.’ I let him get away with it by saying, “It’s right that we’re giving
aid to the Indians and [ ] the Turks and the Kurds, but it’s wrong that we’re doing nothing at
home.” But Carville turned that, in various ways, into ‘Take care of our own.’ I could never say
that.
I did once blow it at a union rally, [by] saying, as we were beginning to really have a wave of
support, and I said, “And so it’s right that we help the Indians and the Indonesians, it’s right that
we help the Kurks and the Turds [sic]”, a total slip of the tongue, and the whole place went
roaring with laughter, everybody [in the campaign] said, “Oh, what a catastrophe.” The unions
[spread] bumper stickers, “Vote for Wofford, not the Kurks and the Turds.” So I don’t think it
hurt our election.
[Clare went on]: “And then third, he inherited as chair of the Democratic Party, and now a
senator and appointed by Governor Casey and [supported by] the labor movement of
Pennsylvania, opposition to NAFTA, and that’s absurd, it embarrasses me with all of our friends,
and those were his three big pitches. Now how do you make sense of that?” that’s how she [put
it].
Now, the real story on why and how we ran with [health care]. There is a [TV] ad we had that
won prizes, and Carville took credit for it in the Wall Street Journal with Al [Albert R.] Hunt
[and in] some other places, in which I stand in a doctor’s office and I pull the Constitution out of
my pocket, pocket Constitution, and say, “In this Constitution, if you’re charged with a crime,
you have a right to a lawyer. Isn’t it even more fundamental if you’re sick to have a right to a
doctor?” And it got enormous response. That came because, picking up a $5000 check from an
ophthalmologist [in] Philadelphia, Dr. [Robert D.] Reinecke, the head of them, gave the check,
and he said, “But far more valuable will be if I tell you what I do when I speak on health care, I
carry my Constitution in my pocket like Justice Black said every American should do, and I pull
it out and I’d say [and he said] just exactly those words.”
And so I started doing it, and in black churches they would go, “Amen, Amen,” and every kind
of audience responded to that pitch. And I told James after a few days, I said, “This is really
clicking.” And he said, “Senator, that’s a theoretical proposition, and it’s another way in which
you’re an academic. American voters don’t like theoretical propositions.” [ ] And I said, “Well,
Lincoln said, ‘The genius of Thomas Jefferson is that in the midst of what would have been
otherwise a merely propaganda document, he began with a great abstract proposition: “All men
are created equal, and born with [certain undeniable] rights,”’ et cetera.” And so I said, “Try it,
James.” [ ] I didn’t think he was going to, and then when we did our first ads, one of the ones
was to try this. And so Dr. Reinecke deserved the credit. All kinds of people have hailed him,
and we’ve had times when he was given credit for it.
BW:
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HW: So that’s how we got on it. And it turned out to be a lightning rod, an electrical spark,
and Clinton picked it up and found it was for him, too.
BW:
-

Right, right. How did you and James Carville interact? I mean, it seemed like you were

HW: Well, he and I are closer in some ways than Bob Casey and James Carville. The best
Gridiron kind of skit that was put on by my chief of communications – ut at that time he was
Governor Casey’s chief, David Stone – which has Casey and his family, stiffly at dinner,
everybody proper and quiet and then somebody said, “There’s a message for you.” And he goes
through the door, and when he goes into the other [room] there’s Carville and everybody, they’re
doing rock ‘n’ roll and moving around, and Carville is dressed up to look like the devil, and the
theory was, it was a pact with the devil and Carville, in the governorship race.
We had our differences. He had an ad in that governorship race that they knew I wouldn’t like as
party chair, and they didn’t tell me. It was a devastating ad against young Bill Scranton, it had
him with his beard, and it was this interview he had given that he and his wife had come back to
Pennsylvania after being converted to the Maharishi [Mahesh Yogi] whatever-his-name-was
guru, anyway, the guru of Transcendental Meditation, and he gave an interview saying, “I’m
coming back to Harrisburg to introduce Transcendental Meditation to the legislature of
Pennsylvania.” He wasn’t in office then, he was just [an ex-] pot-smoking hippie Democrat.
We had joked when he first started getting interested in politics, I met him at a dinner with the
[future] governor up in Scranton, [at the home of] Maury Myers, his lawyer, [and Sondra
Myers]. And the question was: can a 1960s Democrat, hippie, pot-smoking Democrat,
McGovern Democrat, transform himself into a respectable Republican and claim his father’s
name and win the, I guess it was the governorship he was going to go for?
[Phone ringing]
BW:

Shall I pause here?

HW: And the [Casey campaign ad] had a picture of this guru who looked like Osama bin
Laden [an ad many think won the race]. So we had clashes of that kind. The biggest was my
reelection campaign. My wife, who had been bored with national service for thirty years, to my
amazement said, “You know, I think you’re going to be surprised, but I propose that you let
Harris really go on AmeriCorps and National Service, because it’s a bill that he was, played a
key role in shaping and in getting through, along with Ted Kennedy, and he’s best talking about
it of anything he talks about, and I think it’ll look [good when] we can’t win on health care now.
[ ] There were two other things I had [helped get] through, the Martin Luther King Day of
Service, and also the National Civilian Community Corps, those two [passed] before Clinton was
elected.
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In any case, Carville said, “Clare, I know one thing about national service, I know it’s nice, but
it’s out on the per-iph-ery, and no one, no one can bring it from the periphery into the center of
public action, nobody.” And when we had the first debates, Santorum showed you can bring it
into the public arena as a big political issue, it was devastatingly negative to answer once he said
that about the hippies, holding hands [and singing] Kumbaya at taxpayers’ expense. So Carville
was wrong on that. Now whether if we had really gone big on that with affirmative ads,
[whether] it would have made that difference [we don’t know]. We lost mainly on the gun issue
and abortion issue, and Casey Democrats. We lost by eighty thousand votes, forty thousand
votes changing out of [about four million] – and Carville and Begala I think estimate on each of
those issues, we lost about two hundred thousand votes. I had no big issue with Thornburgh on
gun control, but I voted for the assault weapon ban [in the summer of 1994 and that made the
gun issue more prominent].
Now, I don’t know whether Mitchell could have kept Dianne Feinstein from bringing up the
assault weapon ban. We wanted her to bring it up after the election, and I am a great friend of
Dianne’s, and people pleaded with her for the sake of Democrats who were up not to bring it up
‘til after the election, but she had her own reasons for, well she passionately believed in it. I had
no choice but to vote for the ban, it’s just not something I could think about. But that turned it
into a real gun owners’ crusade against me, and Santorum had – have you ever seen the target
that was sold? He didn’t know about it, I’m sure, he said he didn’t – but the gun owners raised
money for Santorum selling target sheets that have “Get the real enemy” and “Wofford” in the
bulls-eye. And he denounced it when it came out, but they had them all around Pennsylvania.
Oh, he actually admitted in an oral taping [for] a documentary being done about me, that he did
go to some of the rallies where they did it, but he never agreed with it. So that was - Mitchell
might have been able to persuade her [not to bring up the matter that election], that’s the only
criticism I have of George Mitchell, that he didn’t succeed.
BW: Hmm-hmm. Do you recall what the issue was where they were rushing to get your vote
when you came in in early ‘91?
HW: No, I don’t. But I do recall Carville being right on [the disadvantage of being on] the
Foreign Relations Committee. Maybe the first meeting, or very early meeting, the Mexico
Declaration, or the policy that Reagan, I think, put through first to prohibit any American money
going to an international organization that facilitates or gives information about abortion,
Planned Parenthood and such, and it suddenly came up, no one knew it was going to be brought
up in the Foreign Relations Committee, and we went all around the table, I mean they just started
voting for some reason on this, and I knew very little about it, [ ] but it seemed to me clearly
something that should be changed. It’s one of the first things Barack did [when he was elected
president]. I voted against the Mexico Doctrine, or whatever it was called, and that turned the
general opposition to me among the [Catholic] hierarchy into, somewhat of a crusade BW:

Hmm-hmm.

HW: - against me.
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BW: Hmm-hmm, hmm-hmm. Did you and George Mitchell ever have a discussion about the
sort of hard-hitting approach that Republicans took on these hot issues?
HW: No, and it wasn’t necessarily something [to talk about] it was so obvious, it was the main
fact of our life that, you know, he was constantly trying to deal with it.
BW:

Hmm-hmm.

HW: I think his, I’d be fascinated to, I would be fascinated to know what Bob Dole said [about
that Republican approach], because I think [he and Mitchell] had a real, it seemed that they had a
real kind of camaraderie. I always believed that Dole wasn’t really a party to the sort of extreme,
the hating and the polarizing politics.
BW:

Except for his own 1974 campaign.

[Phone ringing]
HW:

‘Seventy-four?

BW:

Yes, when abortion came up as an issue, but that’s an aside.

HW:

You mean when he ran for office?

BW:

That’s right.

[Pause in taping]
BW:

You became in ‘91 the sort of poster boy for health care.

HW: Right.
BW: And I guess, would you say that because of your success with the issue that the Clinton
people really picked up on it and -?
HW: Yes, they also picked up Carville. The day after my election, Clinton called and said,
“What about this Ragin’ Cajun I’ve been reading about? Is he crazy or is he good, or would you
recommend that I talk to him and think of having him in a big role in my campaign?” And I
must have on balance said, “Yes.”
BW: So, what you said earlier, I take it that the Clintons really didn’t then seek a lot of your
advice or input or anything on a health care plan.
HW:

Not at all. Now, what they did do, and Hillary’s answer, is ask for the pro-health care
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senators to loan staff to Hillary’s task force. And one very fine staff person who was my chief
health care person - Two, but she most of all, but we had two who got assigned, and they were
on different task forces and I knew more or less what they were doing on those task forces. But
it wasn’t that they thought that Darrel [Jodrey] was going to supply my ideas, they thought she
was a good staff person to do what Ira Magaziner wanted that task force to do.
No, basically, I don’t think Hillary ever seemed open or interested in talking to me about it. I
finally, because of – not that I had blinding light as to what should be done, but I was close to the
Daschle approach, which was different. But I increasingly felt that there had to be a
compromise, and I asked to see Bill Clinton, the president, and I did see him once. But no, I
have great respect for Hillary, I stayed loyal to her on the health care plan to the end, though
several people on my staff thought that for reelection I ought to be distancing myself from her
plan. And she’s an extraordinary person; I think she’s very possibly going to be one of our great
secretaries of state.
BW:

You -

HW: She was spectacular [ ] when she had the briefing of Congress on the health care plan.
She spent two whole days, I think, and I think the Senate and the House separately, and we had
three hours with her and basically without a note presenting it, and questions and answers. And
the health care plan began at sort of seventy-five percent approval. There’s a correlation
between the health care plan [ ] in the fall to starting at seventy-five percent, going, by spring, to
thirty percent or something like that, it’s very closely connected with the fall of Bill Clinton’s
[support, with] Whitewater and [sexual charges], this is before Monica, but the press stories on
Clinton and health care, whatever it is, Lexis[Nexis], the outfit that measures the number of press
stories on particular things, [ ] but it was something like twenty-six thousand articles on the sex
charges, and twenty-four thousand on Whitewater, and health care sort of nineteen thousand,
over the six months period. So there were bigger factors working than just the arguments on
health care, and that’s the president’s popularity. That would certainly happen if Barack’s
popularity plummeted, his chance of getting anything big or controversial through would be nil.
And that was, I think, the bottom line story on health care.
BW:

You formed a group, the Universal Coverage Group, is that correct?

HW:

In the Senate?

BW:

Hmm-hmm.

HW: I was in a little group with Daschle. I don’t know what we called it, but we were for
universal coverage. That didn’t mean the mandatory [requirement], necessarily.
BW:

Nor single-payer.

HW:

It was not single-payer; theoretically I’m for single-payer. I think it’s a misleading and
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terribly bad name, people don’t know what that means. But if you think of Medicare being for
all, and highly subsidized for the poor, or the new public option that Barack is supporting, the
aim is universal coverage, but we’re getting it by increments and now we need a quantum leap,
but we’re very close to universal coverage for children.
BW:

You were not part of the mainstream group that John Chafee and others formed.

HW:

No.

BW:

And why didn’t you, was that by invitation only?

HW: No, I was a very loyal Clinton person, the way right now I would, even more than I felt
about Clinton, I would want to be supporting Barack Obama.
BW:

You say supporting Clinton; you mean Clinton and his plan, his health plan?

HW:

And other things, but that was the most controversial, yes.

BW:

Right.

HW: And I had staff people [who] wanted me to distance [myself], but it wasn’t really
thinkable for me, I campaigned all over the country for Clinton and I had tremendous hopes for
him. Never quite the passion I have for Barack, but I started very high.
BW: Were there other issues that were very important to you which relied on the support of
George Mitchell?
HW: Yes, national service, the first National Service Act actually, that’s 1990, under Bush the
First. And it was Kennedy that took the initiative and he called me down from Pennsylvania
where I was secretary of labor and industry and [had] started the Governor’s Office on Citizen
Service, for an evening, saying, “I’ve helped shoot down the Democratic Leadership Council
Program that gets large scale national service by requiring service, if you want federal aid.” And
for various reasons, he opposed it and joined the Black Caucus in shooting that down. He said,
“But I want to, instead of a stick, I want a carrot. I wanted the National Service Bill.” And then
we knew we had no chance unless Bush would come along, and he had launched his Points of
Light initiative, Thousand Points of Light. And so it became the National Service Pilot Program
under a commission on national service that funded some of the first full time service programs
like City Year, when we got it passed, and I lobbied and worked for that, and George was helpful
on that. When did he go to the Senate?
BW:

In [‘80].

HW:

Yes, see, so he was, by ‘89 and ‘90, was he majority leader already? No, was he?

Page 14 of 20

BW:

In ‘89 he was.

HW: Right, well he was helpful on that bill, and combining the Bush Points of Light with the
Kennedy-Wofford national service approach. And then we had the big Clinton bill, and yes, I
think George not only supported it and put it on fast track – the way Barack asked for the great
new quantum leap, Kennedy’s Serve America Bill, the Hatch-Kennedy Serve America Bill.
George was a staunch supporter of it from the beginning. And we would have had substantial
bipartisan support if the White House had not insisted on a particular formula and how much
money and how fast we would begin. Nancy Kassebaum came in with maybe a dozen
[Republican] senators [who] would support the bill if instead of for the first three years [going to
fifty thousand national service positions, it only went to thirty-five thuousand or something like
that]. We negotiated down, and she finally gave [her] last [number], biggest [ ] for three years
and I wanted us to accept it, and I would suspect that George did, but the White House called the
signal and [ ] said, “We won’t compromise anymore, we’re going to win with Democratic
votes.” I think we got four or five Republicans instead of fifteen.
BW:

Hmmm.

HW: And Nancy, [years later] when she was with her husband, the ambassador in Japan, they
had, my grandson and [me to dinner]. We were going around the world. And she went back
over this, she said, “You know, if you had all accepted [my number], the five years of trying to
make it bipartisan might not have been necessary.” She was right. I suspect George [might
agree, but] I don’t think he was able to do anything with the White House, but as far as I know,
he didn’t.
BW:

Did he share with you any frustrations with the White House?

HW: Not personally. In that sense he played his cards close to the vest. He knows everybody
likes to tell stories, and knowledge is power, and I didn’t have any sense he was in the business
of sharing. I thought he was very open in considering things I was interested in, but no, I wish I
knew more about his workings. I suspect Berl knows a lot, and then there is a man named
George Mitchell who knows even more. Is he doing oral history?
BW:

You know, I don’t know the answer to that.

HW:

You better get him.

BW:

Mitchell?

HW:

Yes.

BW:

Yes, well I think that would probably occur up in Maine, I suspect.

HW: Yes.
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BW:

But I don’t know the story on that.

HW: But I mean he can do it while he’s alive, and for John or Robert Kennedy, it’s always
after BW:

Right, right, right.

HW: - their death.
BW: Did Mitchell confer with you when he was considering retiring, or did that just come out
of the blue as far as you were concerned?
HW:

Out of the blue.

BW:

And what was your reaction?

HW: Sorrow. But he retired with dignity, unlike Tim Wirth who retired with this wave of
recriminations. And [Tim] wrote a New York Times piece about the corruption and money, and it
left a very sour taste. I think Mitchell, probably everywhere he goes, leaves with a good sense of
trust. I have another staff man who worked carefully [in the Senate, a] very, very wise guy; he’s
now very successful in the Accenture firm, and was my man on national service and other things.
[He says,] “George is about public service, active duty citizenship, always stepped forward to
listen and learn and make a difference on some of the toughest issues of our time when asked,
whether by fellow senators, presidents Clinton, Bush, Obama asked him to do things, [ ] majority
leader, Northern Ireland, Israel, Palestine, steroids in baseball. He deserved the Presidential
Medal of Freedom, and he won the Liberty Award in Philadelphia a few years ago, one of the
biggest things Philadelphia gives.” That’s somewhat different from my other staff man.
BW:

Hmm-hmm.

HW: [p/o] I’m very high on Mitchell in my own experience. [ ] The great mystery, for
somebody who was only there four years, [ ] [is the explanation for] the graph downward in
collegiality and civility and searching for common ground. [ ] It was much better [ ] when I got
there, and I think, I know that that quality seems to have deteriorated since I was there, since
Mitchell left.
But again, there are big forces, Gingrich’s leadership of the House set the pace, and very sadly,
because he began as a man of ideas and his two-hour whatever it was instructions to Democrats
in the House on how to spend their holiday and vacation, Christmas, after he’d been elected
majority leader, he gave them a list of great books, two or three, that they had to read, and he
started talking about a laptop for every young person, and “We have to have answers to poverty.”
He’s a real mixed one.
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BW: How do you see the Senate ever getting to the point where long-term planning takes
over, rather than short term strategizing? And the reason I ask this question is because it came
up HW: How does that –?
BW:

- in Senator Rockefeller’s tribute to you, when you were leaving the Senate.

HW:

Jay Rockefeller’s?

BW: Hmm-hmm, when he said that, “We should be thinking about the next generation rather
than the next election.” And it seemed to me that you came into the Senate with a sense of longterm future and what you need to do.
HW:

Yes, I was, I didn’t have much of a long term.

BW: Personally, right. But I don’t mean in terms of your personal career, but in terms of the
issues that you were dealing with.
HW: Oh, I think that’s a fundamental problem in American politics and life, including the
corporate world; the corporate world is wild for the quarterly or whatever their measurement is
of profits. And Toynbee, this historian that I love, even though I haven’t read all of his nine
volumes, we had a great seminar leader that, while I was at Covington & Burling, wanted to read
Toynbee with a group, Scott Buchanan, the founder of the Great Books at St. John’s College, and
we got through about six volumes. But [Toynbee] says of that [ ] [program], he says, “the urgent
is the enemy of the important.” Looking at civilizations and societies [shows] how the urgent
leading to catastrophes and the important being neglected combined [in] the perfect storm of
what brings societies down. And certainly the [new] mass media has added, the Internet, this
swirling information, has added to this sense of the urgent taking over [ ]. Time to think about
things is hard to find in so much of policy-making in the country and in the shaping of public
opinion. And so I don’t know what wisdom I have [on this].
BW: Well this question occurred to me, I was reading your foreign policy piece that you
wrote in 1992, about the downfall of the Soviet Union and what an opportunity there was, at that
point, to readjust our foreign policy and our priorities. And I looked at that and I thought, “Boy,
we haven’t come very far along, have we?”
HW: No. The story of missed opportunities is something, in the memoirs I’m writing [about.
It’s] so vivid to me that, in foreign policy the greatest opportunity was with the end of the Cold
War and with the complete end, at that point, of Stalinism and the flux in the Soviet empire, and
[then] the collapse of [that] empire. That was the time for institution-building in the world, and
we went petty instead of big, I mean the U.N. became increasingly an irritant rather than an
institution that maybe at that point could move beyond the veto. And just take the U.N. itself, let
alone the [thing that was], the urgency during so much of my life, the arms race with the Soviet
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Union.
[I asked] Carl Kazen, who was deputy head of security for [presidents Kennedy] to Johnson,
once said to me [when I asked], “What’s your lesson from being in the White House with two
presidents?” And he said, “In determining the time they spent thinking about or dealing with
questions, I would like to put a sign up in front of the president that [reads], ‘There’s one in four
chances that we’ll have war, and you are spending three fourths of your time dealing with the
arms race and the urgencies of the assumption there might be war,’ and the attention to all the
other things that ought to be done goes [under] to that urgent crisis.”
And there [were] the developing nations, more than half of the world poor and not really caring
about either the Soviet Union or the United States or the Cold War, desperately needing
education and development. [It was] not only the resources that were put into the arms race but
the lack of moving, even in the arms race, moving to see the opportunity we had with Asia and
Africa and Latin America.
Kennedy started in that direction, the Alliance for Progress in South America, [and] we did it in
the high vision and high spirit and can-do spirit of winning World War II, we did the Marshall
Plan, and [at home] the G.I. Bill and other things. But [ ] it isn’t that a Marshall Plan is what was
needed for India or Asia or Africa, but the equivalent thereof in vision and size and scope. We
lost it, if you’re thinking in terms of a world community [that] isn’t dominated by anybody.
There [was] one silver lining for those that don’t want any country to dominate --- we have
blown American leadership in the world and it’s just almost a miracle that Barack has come
along and is rebuilding it with a speed I didn’t – I did once I got to know him – think [ ] could
happen with him. But until he came along I would say, how [do] you repair decades of up and
down, but of never really seizing the opportunities that [we had]?
BW:

Right. Have you had contacts with George Mitchell?

HW: I went up to the tribute dinner that Berl and his firm put on about a year ago. I’ve been
to [ ] [other] tribute affairs to George, and have had, you know, fun in the interval talking,
usually listening to Berl and George talk. And I think he’s spoken at the Council on Foreign
Relations when I was there. I like very much hearing, I was [and] am deeply interested in his
Middle Eastern mission. My wife and I were part of an international group that spent a summer
on a kibbutz in Israel in 1950, and I’ve been a lover of the pioneer state society that they built
before they had a state, but I think the tragic vicious circle of the Palestinians and the Israelis is [
] one of the greatest problems in the world; it festers our relationship with the whole Islamic
world [p/o].
Alexander Hamilton said that, “It wasn’t the Federalist Paper or rhetoric that persuaded the
colonies to form a Constitution – ratify a Constitution – and form a common government; it was
the harsh logic of events.” And I have a hope that in the Middle East right now, the harsh logic
of events is going to make it the time for Mitchell and Barack, I thought [Barack’s] Cairo speech
was one of the most important things that’s happened in foreign policy, in terms of America’s
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role in the world. And Mitchell is – I don’t think he has the soaring vision of Barack, but I think
he’s the sort of person Barack needs to try to seize the moment and get something good coming
out of it.
BW:

Right. How do you think George Mitchell should be remembered?

HW: I think he should be remembered as someone, wherever you put him down, tried to find
common ground and give an example of how you search for common ground for the common
good. And you put him down on any problem or any part of the world, and the needle on his
compass goes to the common good. And applying reason and believing that the American
system is designed to enable reason to rule, and that it wasn’t designed by cheerful optimists, it
was designed by people that in the debates in Philadelphia and in the Federalist Papers knew that
factions and original sin and everything else of human nature is part of the game, but that the
Constitution was designed to make people reason, and they need people like George Marshall
[sic: Mitchell] to make it work.
BW:

George Mitchell.

HW: I like George Marshall, too. Yes, I would say we’ve just named two Georges that have
exactly the same trait. And you know that when Colin Powell was accosted by the editorial
board of the Washington Post for staying in the Cabinet with Bush, after he knew Bush wasn’t
listening to him on whichever issue but Iraq, of course, the biggest, that he had turned to Cheney
and Rumsfeld and he was ignoring Powell. And Powell said, “There were two things that, my
master image of what a soldier statesman should be” – George Marshall – [ ] two things he most
wanted: one was to lead the forces liberating Europe, in command, and the other was not to
recognize Israel ten minutes after midnight but to take time and become a real mediator in what
was going to emerge, to defend Israel but not to go out in front so fast. And the first, Roosevelt
said, “I need you at the desk running the war back here,” and the second, Truman ignored his
advice and went ahead, and Marshall continued and we had a Marshall Plan. And I think George
[who] is not a soldier, [is] that kind of a statesman. I put him in the same [category]; it was a
good Freudian slip.
BW:

Good. I want to pause here for just a second.

(Pause in taping.)
BW: This has been a remarkable interview, and I really want to thank you for your time and
for all of your information, and for what you stand for.
HW: Now can we, I should have made the bargain before we did the interview, can I have a
tape of the interview?
BW:

Well, let’s talk about that off tape, okay?
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End of Interview
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